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Résumé / Abstract
Nous étudions le problème de localisation sous lhypothèse que le
débordement technologique est fonction de la distance entre les entreprises
oligopolistiques qui font concurrence à la Cournot. La concentration géographique
savère optimale dans certains cas. Dans dautres cas, léquilibre implique la
dispersion géographique.
A model of location choice by Cournot oligopolists is presented,
under the assumption that R&D spillovers depend on the distance between firms.
We show that a variety of patterns emerge. Agglomeration is optimal under
certain assumptions. Geographical dispersion in a two-dimensional plane is
another possible outcome.
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1 Introduction
Ever since Marshall (1890), it has been well recognized that an industry
may be geographically concentrated because agglomeration tends to gen-
erate various \externalities" such as (i) mass-production (the so-called
internal economies which are similar to the scale economies), (ii) the
formation of a pool market for specialized labor, (iii) the development of
specialized input services, and (iv) the existence of modern infrastruc-
tures. The so-called Marshallian externalities play a central role in the
new economic geography literature (see Fujita and Thisse, 1997, for a
recent survey).
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However, very little attention has been paid in theory to the inter-
action between innovation activity and the spatial clustering of rms.
This is rather surprising since the localized nature of business and aca-
demic research is a well-documented fact (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996;
Feldman and Florida, 1994; Jae et al, 1993). In particular, the results
obtained by Jae et al. suggest that \these eects are quite large and
quite signicant statistically" (p. 595). Approximately 60 percent of
citations come from the primary patent class (p. 596). Citations to
domestic patents are more likely to be domestic, and more likely to
come from the same state and metropolitan statistical areas as the cited
patents. In this case, we may expect the spillover functions to be convex
in distance.
If rms do learn from each other through knowledge spillovers, which
depend on the geographical proximity, they will have an incentive to
agglomerate in order to internalize the R&D externalities generated by
the others. However there is another force that works in the opposite
direction. Since rms are rivals in the product market, geographical
proximity makes competition ercer. Hence we may not expect a general
result to hold. The outcome depends on the relative strenghts of these
two forces.
The primary purpose of this paper is to show that a small number of
rms competing strategically are likely to agglomerate when the spillover
eect is convex in distance. This result is in accordance with the empir-
ical ndings mentioned above. Our secondary purpose is to show that
agglomeration does not necessarily occur when spillovers are concave in
distance.
It is worth noticing that our results are consistent with some other
models developed in economic geography. For example, in a dierent
1
For some recent contributions, see Carlton (1995), David and Rosenbloom (1990),
Glaeser et al. (1992), Head et al (1995), Kim (1995), Wheeler and Mody (1992),
Woodward (1992).
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context where consumers have a dispersed shopping behavior, agglomer-
ation of rms occurs when the shopping function is concave in distance
(Papageorgiou and Thisse, 1985). In the same vein, Ogawa and Fu-
jita (1980) show that rms agglomerate in a Central Business District
when the face-to-face communication eld is linear in distance. When
this function is convex, several clusters are likely to emerge (Fujita and
Ogawa, 1982). Finally, in a spatial competition model a la Hotelling
where R&D costs are a decreasing and convex function of the interrm
distance, Mai and Peng (1997) emphasize the existence of a tradeo be-
tween the spillover eect and the competition eect. Firms get closer
and closer when the relative importance of the R&D function increases.
All these results therefore suggest that concave accessibility functions or
convex spillover functions favors the emergence of one center. On the
contrary, convex accessibility function and concave spillover functions
are consistent with several centers (see also Fujita and Thisse, 1997).
In the spirit of spatial competition models, we consider a two-stage
model where rms choose rst their locations and then compete in quan-
tity. Our results are established in the Euclidean plane. Thus we de-
parture from the \long narrow city" model used by location theorists
and urban economists. In general, we cannot rule out the possibility of
a dispersed location equilibrium. However, when the spillover functions
are convex in distance, there is always some clustering of rms. As sug-
gested by an example, concavity seems to be consistent with a dispersed
equilibrium.
Finally, we consider the possibility that some rms choose to coop-
erate in R&D while remaining rivals in the product market, as in the
models of semi-collusion developed by Friedmann and Thisse (1993) and
Fershtman and Gandal (1994). Possible extensions are indicated in the
concluding section.
2 Location Choice in a Duopoly with R&D
Spillovers
In this section, we consider a two-stage game between two rival rms.
In the rst stage, they choose their locations, which inuence the extent
of their mutual technological spillovers, and therefore their cost struc-
tures. In the second stage, they produce their outputs and compete in
quantities.
Let us solve for the equilibrium of the second stage, for any given cost
structure. Let 
i
denote rm i 's unit cost of production. The inverse
demand function is P = P (Q), with P
0
(Q) < 0, where Q = q
1
+ q
2
.
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Firm i 's prot is

i
= [P (Q)  
i
]q
i
: (1)
Implicit in (1) is the assumption that transport costs are zero. This
allows us to focus on the role of distance in the extent of R&D spillovers.
The role of proximity to markets is by now well understood, and would
unnecessarily complicate our analysis.
Firm i knows the value of 
i
and 
j
, and takes q
j
as given. It choose
q
i
to maximize prot. The rst order condition for an interior maximum
is
P
0
(Q)q
i
+ P (Q) = 
i
(2)
and the second order condition is
P
00
(Q)q
i
+ 2P
0
(Q) < 0: (3)
Summing (2) over the two rms, we obtain
P
0
(Q)Q+ 2P (Q) = 
1
+ 
2
= 
s
(4)
where 
s
denotes the sum of the two unit costs. Equation (4) indicates
that the equilibrium industry output depends only on the sum of the
unit costs, and is independent of how this sum is split between 
1
and

2
. This result is due to Bergstrom and Varian (1985). We assume that
the left-hand side of (4) is a monotone decreasing function of Q, that is,
QP
00
(Q) + 3P
00
(Q) < 0 (5)
or, equivalently,
E < 3 (6)
where E denotes the elasticity of slope of the demand function:
E =
 P
00
(Q)Q
P
0
(Q)
: (7)
Condition (5) is the usual stability condition; see Dixit (1986), for
example. Note that if the industry's marginal revenue curve is downward
sloping, then E < 2.
From (4) and (6), we have the result that the equilibrium output is
a decreasing function of 
s
:
3
dQ
d
s
=
1
(3 E)P
0
< 0 (8)
We now seek to express rm i 's prot in the equilibrium of stage
two as a function of 
i
and 
s
. From (2),
q
i
=
P (Q)  
i
 P
0
(Q)
: (9)
Substitute this into (1):

i
=
(P (Q)  
i
)
2
 P
0
(Q)
= [ P
0
(Q)]q
2
i
(10)
where Q is a function of 
s
, by (4) or (8).
We now describe the stage-one game. Without loss of generality, we
x the location of rm 1 and let rm 2 choose its distance d from rm
1. We assume that

i
=    r
i
; (i = 1; 2) (11)
where r
i
is the reduction in unit cost due rm i 's R&D expenditure, x
i
,
and the spillovers it obtains from the other rm's R&D expenditure, x
j
.
The magnitude of these spillovers depends on the geographical distance
d between the two rms:
r
i
= f(X
i
); f
0
(X
i
) > 0; (12)
X
i
= x
i
+ (d)x
j
; 
0
(d) < 0; 1 > (d) > 0; (13)
where, following Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992), we may call X
i
rm i
's eective R&D investment, and (d) the spillover coecient. Kamien,
Muller and Zang postulated that  is a positive constant, while we allow
 to be a positive and decreasing function of the distance d.
In order to focus on the choice of location, we assume that the rms
have made a symmetric choice x
1
= x
2
= x. We then show that the
optimal distance is zero, independent of x:
Proposition 2.1 . Assume that E < 2. Then in a symmetric equilib-
rium, the distance between the two rms is zero.
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Proof: Omitted, as it can be constructed from the proof of Proposition
3.1 in section 3.
The intuition behind Proposition 2.1 is as follows. Given x
1
= x
2
=
x, the closer the rms are to each other, the higher is their eective R&D
investment. The resulting cost reduction will increase each rm's prot,
provided that the equilibrium price does not fall too much. The condition
E < 2 guaranties that the equilibrium price does not fall signicantly.
It can be easily veried that E < 2 is the condition that the industry's
marginal revenue, P
0
(Q)Q+ P (Q), is a decreasing function of Q.
Proposition 2.1 is not really surprising, because it has been shown
(see Seade (1985)) that if E > 2 [respectively, E < 2 ],then a uniform
increase [respectively, decrease] in unit cost across all rms will increase
the prot of all rms in a symmetric Cournot oligopoly. Therefore if
E < 2, the two Cournot rivals have an incentive to agglomerate to
reduce cost.
We now turn to a more interesting model where there are more than
two rms, and an equilibrium location choice may be asymmetric, at
least when a subset of rms cooperate in R&D.
3 Location Choice in an Oligopoly without
R&D Cooperation
We now formulate a model where the locational choice of a rm can be
anywhere or a plane, and rms are not required to be symmetrically
located. This is an advance over existing models where rms are either
constrained to be on the same straight line, or required to be symmetri-
cally placed on a circle.
Assume there are three rms, 1 , 2 and 3. Let d
1
(respectively d
2
)
denote the distance between 1 and 3, (respectively, 2 and 3). Let d
denote the distance between 1 and 2. The counterparts of (13) are:
X
3
= x
3
+ (d
1
)x
1
+ (d
2
)x
2
(14)
X
1
= x
1
+ (d)x
2
+ (d
1
)x
3
(15)
X
2
= x
2
+ (d)x
1
+ (d
2
)x
3
(16)
The three rms need not necessarily locate themselves on the same
straight line. They may, for example, each occupy a corner (vertex) of a
triangle. Their eective R&D investments reduce unit costs in the way
described by (12), with i = 1; 2; 3.
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In the second stage of the game, the locations have been determined,
and the cost reductions r
1
, r
2
, r
3
have been known. Firms then compete
by choosing outputs. Again, the rst order conditions are:
P
0
(Q)q
i
+ P (Q) = 
i
(i = 1; 2; 3) (17)
Summing (17) over all rms to obtain
P
0
(Q)Q+ 3P (Q) = 
1
+ 
2
+ 
3
= 
s
; (18)
where 
s
is the sum of the three unit costs. A stability condition (see
Dixit (1986)) is that the left-hand side of (18) is decreasing in Q. This
holds, for the 3-rm case, if and only if
E < 4; (19)
where E is dened by (7). We then have
dQ
d
s
=
1
(4  E)P
0
< 0: (20)
Again, rm i 's equilibrium prot is given by

i
=
(P (Q)  
i
)
2
 P
0
(Q)
= ( P
0
(Q))q
2
i
: (21)
We now posit the following problem. Suppose that rms 1 and 2 have
chosen their locations, and therefore d (the distance between them) is
by now given. Assume d > 0. What is rm 3
0
s optimal location choice
? Again, for simplicity, we assume that the nominal R&D expenditure
levels x
1
, x
2
, x
3
have been chosen. Given d, rm 3 must choose d
1
and
d
2
, subject to the triangle inequality,
d
1
+ d
2
 d: (22)
Without loss of generality, we require
d
1
  d
2
 0 (23)
d
2
 0 (24)
(The constraint d
1
 0 is implied by (23) and (24) above.)
Consider the Lagrangian function
L = 
3
+ (d
1
+ d
2
  d) + (d
1
  d
2
) + d
2
(25)
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The necessary conditions are,
@L
@d
1
=
@
3
@
3
@
3
@d
1
+
@
3
@Q
@Q
@
s
@
s
@d
1
+  +  = 0 (26)
@L
@d
2
=
@
3
@
3
@
3
@d
2
+
@
3
@Q
@Q
@
s
@
s
@d
2
+    +  = 0 (27)
where, from (21) and (9)
@
3
@
3
=
2(P (Q)  
3
)
 P
0
(Q)
=  2q
3
(28)
@
3
@Q
=
 2(P (Q)  
3
)(P
0
)
2
+ (P
00
)(P   
3
)
2
( P
0
)
2
(29)
From (29) and (20),
@
3
@Q
@Q
@
s
=
 q
3
(2  s
3
E)
4 E
(30)
where s
3
is rm 3 's market share:
s
3
=
q
3
Q
(31)
Finally,
@
3
@d
i
=  f
0
(X
3
)
0
(d
i
)x
i
; (i = 1; 2) (32)
@
s
@d
i
=  
0
(d
i
)[x
3
f
0
(X
i
) + x
i
f
0
(X
3
)]; (i = 1; 2) (33)
Conditions (26) and (27) become:
2q
3
f
0
(X
3
)
0
(d
1
)x
1
 
q
3
(2  s
3
E)
(4 E)
[x
3
f
0
(X
1
) + x
1
f
0
(X
3
)]
0
(d
1
)++ = 0
(34)
2q
3
f
0
(X
3
)
0
(d
2
)x
2
 
q
3
(2  s
3
E)
(4 E)

x
3
f
0
(X
1
) + x
2
f
0
(X
3
)


0
(d
2
)+ + = 0
(35)
In addition, we have
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  0; (d
1
  d
2
) = 0;   0; (d
1
+ d
2
  d) = 0;   0; d
2
= 0 (36)
The following proposition follows immediately:
Proposition 3.1:Given the distance between rms 1 and 2, assume that
R&D expenditures are the same for all three rms, and f(X) is linear. If
E < 2, then rm 3 will choose to be on the straight line segment joining
rm 1 and rm 2. In other words, d
1
+ d
2
= d.
Proof : Suppose rm 3 is not located on the straight line segment
joining rm 1 and rm 2. Then d
1
+ d
2
> d and  = 0.
Then from (34) and (35)
2q
3
f
0
(X)x
(4 E)
(2  (1  s
3
)E)
0
(d
1
) =   (37)
2q
3
f
0
(X)x
(4 E)
(2  (1  s
3
)E)
0
(d
2
) =    (38)
There are three mutually exclusive (and exhaustive) possibilities: (a)
d
1
  d
2
> 0, d
2
> 0, (b) d
1
= d
2
> 0 and (c) d
2
= 0. Case (a) implies
 =  = 0, which is not possible because the left-hand side of (37) is
negative. Case (b) implies  = 0. Adding (37) and (38) then gives an
equation with two identical negative terms on the left-hand side, and
zero on the right- hand side, which is not possible. Case (c) implies
that rm 3 and rm 2 occupy the same location which is consistent with
what we want to prove (i.e, d
1
+ d
2
= d). This completes the proof of
Proposition 3.1.
Having proved that rm 3 is located on the straight line segment
joining rm 1 and rm 2, we now wish to nd out whether it is located
exactly in between them. The following Proposition provides an answer.
Proposition 3.2: Given the assumptions stated in Proposition 3.1,
(a) If  is a strictly concave function, then rm 3 will be located
exactly in between rm 1 and rm 2 ( so that d
1
= d
2
=
d
2
).
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(b) If  is a strictly convex or linear function, then rm 3 will choose
to be as close to rm 2 as possible.
Proof:
(a) Assume  is strictly concave. Suppose d
2
= 0 and d
1
= d, then
 = 0. Subtracting (38) from (37):
2q
2
f
0
(X)x
(4 E)
[2  (1  s
3
)E][
0
(d)  
0
(0)] =   0; (39)
which is not possible because 
0
(d) 
0
(0) < 0 when  is strictly concave.
It follows that d
2
> 0. With d
2
> 0, we have  = 0 and   0: In this
case, subtracting (38) from (37) yields
2q
2
f
0
(X)x
(4 E)
[2  (1  s
3
)E][
0
(d
1
)  
0
(d
2
)] =  2 (40)
If d
1
> d
2
then  = 0 while 
0
(d
1
)  
0
(d
2
) < 0 due to the concavity
of  ; therefore (40) would be violated. It follows that d
1
= d
2
, in view
of the constraint (23).
(b) If  is strictly convex or linear, then (39) can be satised.
This completes the proof of Proposition 3.2.
Example 3.1
Assume that the demand function is linear:
P (Q) = a  bQ; a > ; b > 0 (41)
and
f(X) = X (42)
Then, in the equilibrium in stage two, we have
q
3
=
1
4b
(a  3
3
+ 
1
+ 
2
) (43)
With x
1
= x
2
= x
3
= x,
q
3
=
1
4b
[a   + x  2(d)x + 2(d
1
)x+ 2(d
2
)x] (44)
Firm 3
0
s prot is, from (21)
9
3
= bq
2
3
(45)
Substitute (44) into (45) and maximize the resulting expression with
respect to d
1
and d
2
subject to d
1
+ d
2
= d (in view of Proposition
3.1). Clearly, with a    + x  0, this maximization is equivalent to
the maximization of (d  d
2
) + (d
2
),where 0  d
2
 d: If  is strictly
concave, then the optimum is at d
2
=
d
2
. If  is strictly convex, then the
optimum is at d
2
= 0 (recall the convention that d
1
 d
2
).
So far we assume that the location of rms 1 and 2 are given. Using
the results of Propositions 3.1 and 3.2, it is clear that if all rms choose
their locations either sequentially or simultaneously, they would end up
in the same location. Thus we have shown:
Proposition 3.3: Given that all rms have the same level of R&D
expenditure (x
i
= x for all i), they will choose to agglomerate to reap
the benets of spillovers.
It is not clear if agglomeration is the equilibrium if some subset of
rms cooperate in their R&D, while others do not. This is the subject
matter of the next section.
4 Location Choice with R&D Cooperation
within a Subset of Firms
We now consider a model with three rms, two of which cooperate in
their R&D activities. Cooperation takes the form of exchange of knowl-
edge. This is modeled as an increase in the spillover coecients. More
specically, suppose that rm 1 and rm 2 cooperate. Then equation
(15) and (16) are replaced by
X
1
= x
1
+ (d)x
2
+ (d
1
)x
3
(46)
X
2
= x
2
+ (d)x
1
+ (d
2
)x
3
(47)
where  > 1. Equation (14) remains valid. We assume (d)  1.
Again, in stage one the rms choose their locations and in stage two
they compete in quantities. Equations (17) to (21) remain valid descrip-
tions of the equilibrium in stage two. In stage one, we assume that rm
10
3 's location is given, and rms 1 and 2 collusively choose their locations
to maximize the sum of their stage two Cournot equilibrium prots.
This formulation is in the tradition of the theory of semi-collusion (as
exemplied by the work of Friedman and Thisse (1993), Fershtman and
Gandal (1994), and others). This theory reects the stylized fact that
rms cooperate on some level, while remaining rivals on some other lev-
els. If the optimal solution is symmetric for these semi-collusive rms,
then no side transfers are required. In the case of an asymmetric so-
lution, some rules for transfers must be specied. For a more detailed
discussion, see Long and Soubeyran (1995).
Given rm 3
0
s location, rms 1 and 2 must choose d
i
( the distance
between rm i and rm 3, i = 1; 2), and d (the distance between rms 1
and 2). Since the three rms must be located on three vertices of some
triangle ( or possibly on a straight line segment, which may be regarded
as limiting case of a triangle with a vanishing area), the following triangle
inequalities must be satised:
d
1
+ d
2
 d (48)
d
2
+ d  d
1
(49)
d
1
+ d  d
2
: (50)
In addition,
d
1
 0 (51)
d
2
 0 (52)
d  0 (53)
Without loss of generality, we specify that
d
1
  d
2
 0 (54)
This condition ensures that (50) and (51) are satised given (52) and
(53). We will therefore need to take into account only (48), (49), (52),
(53) and (54).
Let 
J
denote the joint (semi-collusive) prot of rms 1 and 2,

J
= 
1
+ 
2
(55)
where each rm
0
s prot is given by (21): it depends on the rm
0
s own
cost, 
i
, and on the equilibrium industry output in the Cournot game,
Q, which in turn depends only on 
s
; see (18) and (20). The distances
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d1
, d
2
and d determine 
i
and 
s
( see (11), (12), (14), (46) and (47)).
We assume that the nominal R&D expenditure levels have been chosen.
The Lagrangian for the semi-collusive prot maximization problem
of rms 1 and 2 is:
L = 
J
+ (d
2
+ d  d
1
) + (d
1
+ d
2
  d) + (d
1
  d
2
) + !d
2
+ d (56)
In what follows, for simplicity, we assume
f(X) = X; x
1
= x
2
= x
3
= x > 0 (57)
The necessary conditions are
@L
@d
1
= 2x
0
(d
1
)A
1
  + +  = 0 (58)
@L
@d
2
= 2x
0
(d
2
)A
2
+ +    + ! = 0 (59)
@L
@d
= 2x
0
(d)A +   +  = 0 (60)
  0 ; (d
2
+ d  d
1
) = 0; d
2
+ d  d
1
 0 (61)
  0 ; (d
1
+ d
2
  d) = 0; d
1
+ d
2
  d  0 (62)
  0 ; (d
1
  d
2
) = 0; d
1
  d
2
 0 (63)
!  0 ; !d
2
= 0; d
2
 0 (64)
  0 ; d = 0; d  0 (65)
where we have used the same technique as that used to derive (34) and
(35) from (26) and (27), and where
A
1
= q
1
+
(s
1
E   2)q
1
+ (s
2
E   2)q
2
4 E
(66)
A
2
= q
2
+
(s
2
E   2)q
2
+ (s
1
E   2)q
1
4 E
(67)
A =
q
1
+ q
2
4 E

2  (1 
q
1
s
1
+ q
2
s
2
q
1
+ q
2
)E

(68)
From the above necessary conditions, we obtain the following propo-
sition.
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Proposition 4.1: Assume that f(X) is linear, and assume positive
outputs.
(a) In equilibrium rms 1 and 2 are not located symmetrically away from
rm 3 and also away from each other. In other words, the conguration
d
1
= d
2
with d > 0 is not consistent with the necessary conditions
.
(b) If the three rms are located on three vertices of a non-degenerate
triangle, then it must be the case that the demand curve is locally strictly
convex, and that rms 1 and 2 are not symmetrically located in relation
to rm 3. In other words, the conguration d
1
+ d
2
> d, d
2
+ d > d
1
,
d > 0 (and d
2
 d
1
) implies E > 0 and d
1
6= d
2
.
(c) If rms 1 and 2 are located at the same place and away from rm
3, then it must be the case that the demand curve is locally concave (or
linear). In other words, if d = 0 and d
1
= d
2
> 0, then E  0.
Proof:
(a) Suppose d
1
= d
2
and d > 0. Then  = ! =  = 0. Also, d
1
= d
2
implies 
1
= 
2
, hence q
1
= q
2
by (17). Therefore A
1
= A
2
. This and
(58) to (59) imply  = 0, and therefore A
i
 0; i = 1; 2. Since q
1
= q
2
,
(66) gives
A
1
=
 q
1
E(1  s
1
)
4 E
(69)
Recall that 4 E > 0 by (19), and that s
1
< 1. Hence A
1
 0 implies
E  0. We now show that this inequality would lead to a contradiction.
Take the case E = 0: Then (69) gives A
1
= 0, hence  = 0 by (58).
Thus A = 0 by (60) with  = 0. But E = 0 implies A > 0 by (68),
given that q
1
and q
2
are positive. Therefore E = 0 is not possible. Now
take the case E < 0. Then by (69) A
1
> 0, and hence  > 0 by (58).
This implies A < 0 by (60). But from (68), E < 0 implies A > 0. The
supposition d
1
= d
2
and d > 0 has led to a contradiction.
(b) Suppose d
2
+ d > d
1
, d
1
+ d
2
> d and d > 0. Then  =  =  = 0.
Equation (60) then gives A = 0. Hence E > 0 by (68), given that q
1
and
q
2
are positive. Finally, d
1
must be dierent from d
2
because as shown
in (a) above, d
1
= d
2
is not possible when d > 0.
(c) If d = 0 (which implies d
1
= d
2
) and d
1
= d
2
> 0 then ! = 0, and

1
= 
2
, q
1
= q
2
, A
1
= A
2
. Adding (58) and (59) yields 4
0
(d
1
)A
1
x +
2 = 0. Hence A
1
 0, implying, via (69), that E  0.
This completes the proof of Proposition 4.1.
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While Proposition 4.1 applies to the case of linear demand as well as
non-linear demand, it is much easier to characterize the equilibrium lo-
cation choice in the linear demand case by exploiting the linear structure
directly. This is shown in the following example.
Example 4.1
Assume P (Q) = a   bQ where a > ; b > 0, and f(X) = X . Then,
in the equilibrium in stage two,
q
1
=
1
4b
(a  3
1
+ 
2
+ 
3
); q
2
=
1
4b
(a  3
2
+ 
1
+ 
3
) (70)
With x
1
= x
2
= x
3
= x > 0, we have
4bq
1
= a 3
1
+ 
2
+ 
3
= a  +x[1+2(d)+2(d
1
) 2(d
2
)] (71)
Without loss of generality we set x = 1. Recall that rm i 's prot is
given by (21) in a Cournot equilibrium. The joint prot of rms 1 and 2
in the semi-collusive equilibrium ( collusive in location choice and R&D,
but rivalry in outputs) is

1
+ 
2
= bq
2
1
+ bq
2
2
(72)
Therefore, maximizing 
1
+ 
2
is equivalent to maximizing the ex-
pression W dened below:
W = (U + V )
2
+ (U   V )
2
(73)
where
U = a   + 1 + 2(d) (74)
V = 2(d
1
)  2(d
2
): (75)
Simplifying, we obtain:
W = 2U
2
+ 2V
2
(76)
The rms 1 and 2 must maximize (76) by choosing d; d
1
and d
2
, subject
to
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d1
  d
2
 0 (77)
d
1
 0 (78)
d
1
+ d
2
 d  d
1
  d
2
(79)
The following result follows immediately:
Lemma 4.2: Assume that the demand function is linear, and that cost
reduction is linear in eective R&D investment). Then the three rms
must be located on the same straight line. Given rm 3's location, the
two semi-collusive rms 1 and 2 will choose to be both to the left, or
both to the right, of rm 3 (the case where all three are located at the
same point is possible).
Proof: For any given pair (d
1
; d
2
), d must be chosen to maximize (76).
This means (d) must be maximized subject to (79). The solution is
d = d
2
  d
1
, because  is a decreasing function.
Lemma 4.2 enables us to simplify problem (76). Without loss of
generality, we can x rm 3 at the origin of the non-negative half of the
real line, and then choose two real numbers d  0 and d
2
 0 (where
d
1
= d+ d
2
without loss of generality).
Lemma 4.3: Under the assumption stated in the preceding lemma, in
equilibrium rm 2 will be located at the same point as rm 3 if  is a
convex function.
Proof: Given any d > 0, write (76) as
W = 2[a   + 1 + 2(d
2
)]
2
+ 8[(d+ d
2
)  (d
2
)]
2
: (80)
Then
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@W
@d
2
= 16[(d+ d
2
)  (d
2
)][
0
(d+ d
2
)  
0
(d
2
)] (81)
Clearly, (d+ d
2
)  (d
2
) < 0, and 
0
(d+ d
2
)  
0
(d
2
)  0, because
 is a convex function. This shows that it is optimal to set d
2
= 0 for
any d > 0.
Proposition 4.4: Given the assumptions in Lemma 4.3, in equilibrium
all three rms must be located at the same point.
Proof: Since d
2
= 0 by Lemma 4.3, we can write (80) as
W = 2[a   + 1 + 2(d)]
2
+ 8[(d)  (0)]
2
: (82)
Therefore
@W
@d
= 8[a   + 1 + 2(d) + 2(d)  2(0)]
0
(d) (83)
which is equal to 24bq
1

0
(d) by (71). Therefore it is optimal to set d = 0.
Finally, let us consider an example where f(X) is not linear.
Example 4.2: Assume f(X
i
) = ln(1 + X
i
); i = 1; 2; 3. With linear
demand and x
1
= x
2
= x
3
= 1, we have, from (70) for i; j = 1; 2
4bq
i
= a   + ln

(2 +  + 
i
)
3
(2 +  + 
j
)(2 + 
1
+ 
2
)

; (84)
where  = (d); 
i
= (d
i
); i = 1; 2.
We want to maximize the joint prot, bq
2
1
+ bq
2
2
. Since (0) < 1, it
is easy to see that for given 
1
and 
2
, q
i
is an increasing function of .
It follows that given d
1
and d
2
 d
1
, the optimal d is d = d
1
  d
2
. In
other words, the three rms must be located on the same straight line,
and rms 1 and 2 will chose to be both on the right, or both on the left
of rm 3. We have therefore obtained the counterpart of Lemma 4.3 for
this example with a non-linear f(X).
16
Next, suppose the distance d is zero. Then d
1
= d
2
and the maxi-
mization of 
1
+ 
2
is equivalent to maximizing, with respect to d
1
,
T = a   + ln

(2 + (d) + 
1
)
2
(2 + 2
1
)

: (85)
The derivative of T with respect to d
1
is positive, given that d = 0.
It follows that the two semi-collusive rms will want to be as far away
from rm 3 as possible.
Proposition 4.4: With f(X) = ln(X +1), the two semi-collusive rms
will want to be as far away from rm 3 as possible.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored the implications of R&D spillovers on the
choice of locations by Cournot oligopolists. We have obtained a variety
of results. The optimal choice seems very sensitive to the specications
of the relationship between cost reduction and R&D spillovers. At one
extreme, rms may want to agglomerate. At the other extreme, one
subset of rms may want to be as far away from the rest as possible.
Our model can be extended in several directions. Firstly, there is an
obvious need to endogenize R&D eort. It would seem natural to model
location choice as preceding the R&D expenditure choice. The incentive
to agglomerate would then be stronger as increased proximity is a partial
substitute for R&D. In addition, if rms are allowed to coordinate their
R&D eorts, there will be a tendency for asymmetric outcomes where
much of the industry's R&D is concentrated in one rm. Long and
Soubeyran (1995) have demonstrated this result in a non-spatial model.
The second avenue for generalization is to introduce transport costs.
In this case, like in the Hotelling model, rms have an incentive to split
the market into segments, so that each rm serves its own segmented
market. This incentive counteracts the agglomerating tendency driven
by the desire to take advantage of spillovers from the R&D expenditure
of other rms.
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